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OF STOLEN ART AND ANTIQUITIES 
Caitlin McBride 
The illicit sale of looted art and antiquities poses an on-going threat to 
global cultural heritage. While international and domestic policies 
attempt to combat this problem, existing systems are rife with 
complications and tend to target only on-going sales. Collectors who are 
already in possession of stolen artifacts are often overlooked, and the 
question becomes how to encourage these collectors to return stolen 
artifacts to the world stage rather than keeping them hidden. Under the 
theory of encouraging repatriation, this Article considers criminal 
deterrence and economic incentive. While no model offers a clear answer 
to this problem, offering limited amnesty and limited economic incentive 
to these collectors promises more voluntary resurfacing of lost and stolen 
art and antiquities.  
 
  
130 Michigan State International Law Review [Vol. 27.1 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................... 131 
II. BACKGROUND: HOW ART THEFT BECAME SUCH A PROBLEM............. 133 
A. Why Cultural Heritage Is So Important ....................................... 133 
B. History: The Rise, the World War, and the Response ................. 136 
III. ECONOMIC INCENTIVES ....................................................................... 141 
IV. CURRENT DETERRENCE SCHEMES ...................................................... 146 
A. International Conventions ............................................................ 146 
B. Domestic Conventions ................................................................. 147 
V. ANALYSIS: IS THERE A SYSTEM THAT WORKS? .................................. 150 
A. Deterrence Without Economic Incentive ..................................... 152 
B. Deterrence With Economic Incentive .......................................... 154 
C. Amnesty Without Economic Incentive ........................................ 156 
D. Amnesty With Economic Incentive ............................................. 158 
E. Proposal: Limited Amnesty With Limited Economic Incentive.. 160 
VI. CONCLUSION ....................................................................................... 163 
 
 
 
  
2018] Raiders of the Lost Art 131 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Pierre Le Guennec was a retired electrician living with his wife, 
Danielle, in the south of France.1 In 2010, he ventured into his garage 
and took a box off the shelf that had been sitting there for almost forty 
years, hoping to sell what was inside to finance an upcoming surgery.2 
Le Guennec contacted a local art appraiser to determine the value of the 
box’s contents: 271 unseen original Picasso sketches3 valued at nearly 
$100 million.4 The appraiser contacted the Picasso estate for 
authentication, prompting the Picassos to alert French authorities.5 
Rather than receiving the modest payout they hoped for, the Le 
Guennecs found themselves sitting in a jail cell for coming forward with 
the sketches.6 At trial, Pierre Le Guennec contended that he had been a 
handyman for Picasso in the early 1970s, and Danielle Le Guennec was a 
friend to Picasso’s wife, Jacqueline.7 Pierre Le Guennec originally 
maintained that the works were a gift from Jaqueline Picasso,8 but later 
revealed that Jaqueline had asked him to store the works to keep them 
from her step-children.9 The Le Guennecs received a two-year suspended  
 
  
 1. See Bill Whitaker, A Picasso Mystery Examined by 60 Minutes, CBS NEWS 
(July 30, 2017), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/60-minutes-picasso-portfolio-stolen-
artwork-or-gift-2/. 
 2. Id. 
 3. See id.; Alyssa Buffenstein, Picasso’s Electrician Back in Court, Admits to 
Lying at Earlier Trial, ARTNET NEWS (Nov. 1, 2016), https://news.artnet.com/art-
world/pierre-le-guennec-stolen-picassos-lying-trial-728519. 
 4. See Whitaker, supra note 1. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id.  
 8. Id. The Picasso administration did not believe their story. Id. According to his 
children, Picasso would never have given such a large amount of art. Id. He occasionally 
gifted brochures or money, but never entire sketchbooks. Id.  
 9. See Picasso’s Widow May Have Hidden Artworks from Family, Court Told, 
THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 31, 2016), 
https://www.theguardian.com/artanddesign/2016/oct/31/pierre-le-guennec-court-picasso-
artworks. Allegedly, Mme. Picasso gave Le Guennec about fifteen garbage bags of 
artwork after the artist’s death, and handed him one, saying “[k]eep this, it’s for you.” Id.  
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sentence for possessing stolen goods.10 When asked what he would have 
done differently, Pierre Le Guennec replied: “If this had to be done all 
over again, well Monseiur, the box would’ve ended up in the chimney.”11 
While the case of Pierre Le Guennec seems incredible, it suggests an 
unspoken network hidden in the black market art trade—thousands of 
collectors in knowing possession of stolen art and antiquities with no 
way to dispose of them.12 Government agencies tend to focus on the 
large-scale black market art trade used to fund criminal enterprises,13 and 
many laws protect truly innocent purchasers who mistakenly stumble 
across illicit goods,14 but those collectors who exist in the middle ground 
get lost through the cracks. Current legal schemes fail to account for 
smaller collectors in possession of stolen cultural heritage items and fail 
to give these collectors any opportunity or incentive to return the missing 
pieces to the world stage.15 This begs the question: how do we encourage 
these collectors to come forward with stolen art and antiquities?  
This Article focuses on how international cultural heritage law can 
encourage private collectors to come forward with stolen artwork while  
  
 10. Jean-Francois Rosnoblet, Elderly French Couple Convicted Over Picasso 
Works Kept in Garage for Decades, REUTERS (Dec. 16, 2016), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-france-picasso-verdict/elderly-french-couple-
convicted-over-picasso-works-kept-in-garage-for-decades-idUSKBN1451I4. 
 11. Whitaker, supra note 1. 
 12. See, e.g., Allison Keyes, Too Many People Have Stolen Egypt’s History; 
Here’s How It’s Getting it Back, THE ROOT (Nov. 05, 2016) 
https://www.theroot.com/too-many-people-have-stolen-egypt-s-history-here-s-how-
1790857588. The problematic buyers of illicit antiquities are typically private collectors 
looking for trophies, rather than larger museums. Id. 
 13. See e.g., Interpol: Cooperation Needed in Fighting Global Art Theft, 
ORGANIZED CRIME AND CORRUPTION REPORTING PROJECT (Oct. 26, 2018), 
https://www.occrp.org/en/daily/8812-interpol-cooperation-needed-in-fighting-global-art-
theft (explaining how art experts are working with INTERPOL to help limit black market 
art used to fund terrorist organizations and other criminal organizations).  
 14. See, e.g., Ian M. Goldrich, Comment, Balancing the Need for Repatriation of 
Illegally Removed Cultural Property with the Interests of Bona Fide Purchasers: 
Applying the UNIDROIT Convention to the Case of the Gold Phiale, 23 FORDHAM INT’L  
L.J. 118, 163 (1999). 
 15. See Interview: Chris Marinello, The Art Loss Register, ART MEDIA AGENCY 
(Jul. 25, 2013), http://en.artmediaagency.com/70447/interview-chris-marinello-
the-art-loss-register/ [hereinafter Interview]. 
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maintaining deterrence on the black market. Part I looks at the historical 
framework of cultural heritage law, noting the importance of heritage as 
a human right, and analyzing how history has led to the existing global 
protection provisions.16 Part II discusses the economic incentives of 
black market art dealing and explains how the trade has become so 
pervasive.17 Part III addresses existing international and domestic 
schemes for dealing with the possession of stolen cultural artifacts.18 Part 
IV breaks down the response to art thefts into four general categories 
based on balancing deterrence and economic incentives, weighing the 
pros and cons of each system.19 Ultimately, this Article proposes a 
middle ground among these theories: offering amnesty for selling to 
certain reputable dealers, but offering a limited economic incentive. 
While not an exhaustive solution, this model could strike a balance 
between encouraging small collectors to come forward with stolen 
cultural property while maintaining some control on curbing black 
market art trade.  
II. BACKGROUND: HOW ART THEFT BECAME SUCH A PROBLEM 
A. Why Cultural Heritage Is So Important 
Cultural heritage is one of the most fundamentally important aspects 
of human culture, enough that it has been globally recognized as a 
fundamental human right.20 The Council of Europe’s Faro Convention 
defines cultural heritage as “a group of resources inherited from the past 
which people identify, independently of ownership, as a reflection and 
expression of their constantly evolving values, beliefs, knowledge and 
traditions.”21 In other words, cultural heritage is not only about  
  
 16. See infra Part I.  
 17. See infra Part II.  
 18. See infra Part III.  
 19. See infra Part IV.  
 20. See JANET BLAKE, INTERNATIONAL CULTURAL HERITAGE LAW 271 (1st ed. 
2015). 
 21. Eur. Consult. Ass., Council of Europe Framework Convention on the Value 
of Cultural Heritage for Society, Treaty Series, Doc. No. 199 (2005).  
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recounting history, but about preserving cultural identity.22
 
This identity 
not only allows a present connection to the past, but it builds 
communities and creates a legacy for future generations.23
 
 
Because the preservation of cultural heritage is globally “recognized 
as a right of all humankind,”24 countless international organizations have 
called for the protection of cultural heritage.25 For example, the United 
Nations Human Rights Council has reflected that “safeguard[ing] 
cultural heritage is a human rights issue,”26 while the Preamble to The 
Hague convention notes that “damage to cultural property belonging to 
any people whatsoever means damage to the cultural heritage of all 
mankind.”27 Thus, cultural heritage is so universally valuable that its 
protection is a global concern.28 
To many scholars, any object of cultural heritage is valuable, no 
matter how minute.29 Cultural heritage objects can be anything from 
manuscripts and coins to vast sculptural monuments; from intangible 
stories to expressive paintings of art.30 These items not only possess a  
  
 22. See id.  
 23. BLAKE, supra note 20, at 271. “[P]roviding a positive legacy for the benefit of 
future generations.”  
 24. BLAKE, supra note 20, at 271. 
 25. See, e.g., Eur. Consult. Ass., supra note 21. 
 26. Human Rights Council, Rep. of the Independent Expert in the Field of 
Cultural 
Rights, Farida Shaheed in Its Seventeenth Session, U.N. Doc A/HRC/17/38, at 19 (Mar. 
21, 2011). The report by the Human Rights Council in March 2011 opens: “As reflected 
in international law and practice, the need to preserve/safeguard cultural heritage is a 
human rights issue. Cultural heritage is important not only in itself, but also in relation to 
its human dimension, in particular its significance for individuals and communities and 
their identity and development processes.” Id.  
 27. Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed 
Conflict with Regulations for the Execution of the Convention 1954 (First Protocol), 
pmbl., May 14, 1954. Available at http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-
URL_ID=13637&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html.  
 28. See BLAKE, supra note 20, at 271. 
 29. See CRAIG FORREST, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE PROTECTION OF 
CULTURAL HERITAGE 5 (2010). 
 30. See What is Meant by “Cultural Heritage”? UNESCO, 
http://www.unesco.org/new/en/culture/themes/illicit-trafficking-of-cultural-
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value in terms of the economic price of the materials from which they are 
made, but more importantly, each item possesses a historic and cultural 
value that is priceless.31 In this sense, the preservation of cultural heritage 
is a zero-sum game—if a piece is destroyed or lost, its cultural integrity 
is gone forever.32 Removing an item from its natural site may destroy 
archaeological and historical evidence, which causes the entire world to 
lose knowledge about the past.33 Furthermore, the destruction of cultural 
heritage objects threatens the understanding and preservation of 
cultures.34 In wars, forces often seek out and destroy historic and artistic 
sites as a military tactic to destroy culture.35 For example, in Bosnia in 
the early 1990s, Bosnian Serb forces specifically targeted and destroyed 
mosques, museums, libraries, and other historical and cultural sites to 
further their goals of genocide.36 Although cultural artifacts may seem at 
times to be nothing more than an insignificant collection of old drawings 
or sculptures, they often have tremendous human significance.37 As such, 
the illegal destruction, excavation, theft, and trade in these objects is a 
monumental threat to cultural heritage, demanding global protection 
efforts.38  
  
property/unesco-database-of-national-cultural-heritage-laws/frequently-asked-
questions/definition-of-the-cultural-heritage/ (last visited Oct. 31, 2018).  
 31. See id.  
 32. See FORREST, supra note 29, at 14 (explaining that the cultural integrity of an 
item will be destroyed if it is broken into parts or damaged). 
 33. See id, at 15. 
 34. FORREST, supra note 29, at 15. 
 35. See Patty Gerstenblith, Article, The Destruction of Cultural Heritage: A 
Crime Against Property or A Crime Against People?, 15 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. 
PROP. L. 336, 341, 343 (2016); See ALESSANDRO CHECHI, THE SETTLEMENT OF 
INTERNATIONAL CULTURAL HERITAGE DISPUTES 153 (2014).  
 36. Helen Walasek, Ethnic Cleansing, War Crimes and the Destruction of 
Cultural Heritage: Not Syria, but Bosnia Twenty Years Ago, OPEN DEMOCRACY (Feb. 22, 
2016), https://www.opendemocracy.net/can-europe-make-it/helen-walasek/ethnic-
cleansing-war-crimes-and-destruction-of-cultural-heritage-no.  
 37. See FORREST, supra note 29, at 15–17. 
 38. See BLAKE, supra note 20, at 23. “The illicit excavation, theft, and illegal 
exportation and trade in cultural objects is a serious threat that damages the cultural 
heritage and, in the most extreme cases even the cultural fabric, of most countries in the 
world.” Id.  
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B. History: The Rise, the World War, and the Response 
The lure of misappropriating cultural heritage has been on-going for 
centuries:39 the conquistadors stripped entire Incan cities of gold,40 
Europeans ravenously looted Egyptian tombs in the Nile Valley during 
the 19th and 20th century,41 and the global spread of imperialism inspired 
the taking of countless treasures from cultural sites.42 However, a global 
focus on the protection of cultural property has only truly taken shape in 
the last half-century, turning on the unprecedented looting and 
destruction of cultural heritage during the First and Second World 
Wars.43  
With the rise of the World Wars came powers of warfare unparalleled 
in human history.44 The staggering capabilities of air-dropped bombs, 
tanks, and atomic weapons left centuries-old sites devastated.45 Cities 
like Dresden46 and Hiroshima47 were annihilated, and others like London  
  
 39. See Lisa J. Borodkin, Note, The Economics of Antiquities Looting and a 
Proposed Legal Alternative, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 377, 391 (1995). 
 40. See generally James Owen, Lost Inca Gold, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC, 
https://www.nationalgeographic.com/archaeology-and-history/archaeology/lost-inca-
gold/ (last visited Jan. 28, 2018).  
 41. See generally Borodkin, supra note 39, at 391. 
 42. See generally Carmen Fishwick, Looted Artefacts, Imperialist Statues: Is 
Repatriation and Removal the Answer?, THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 22, 2016, 08:29 EST), 
https://www.theguardian.com/community/2016/feb/22/looted-artefacts-imperialist-
statues-repatriation-removal-answer. 
 43. See FORREST, supra note 29, at 56. “The unprecedented destruction wrought 
in the First World War, and the wholesale destruction, pillage, plunder and looting of 
cultural heritage during the Second World War, galvanised [sic] international action to 
create an international regime that would protect cultural heritage during armed conflicts 
. . . .” Id. 
 44. See generally Gerstenblith, supra note 35, at 341. “World War II saw the 
most extensive destruction, theft, and movement of cultural objects at any time in world 
history.” Id. 
 45. See generally FORREST, supra note 29, at 73; Marc Lallanilla, Hiroshima, 
Nagasaki & the First Atomic Bombs, LIVESCIENCE (May 9, 2014, 07:27 PM), 
https://www.livescience.com/45509-hiroshima-nagasaki-atomic-bomb.html. 
 46. See, e.g., Bombing of Dresden, HIST. (Nov. 9, 2009), 
http://www.history.com/topics/world-war-ii/battle-of-dresden. 
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left in tatters, eliminating centuries of history, art, and architecture in the 
blink of an eye.48 For example, the 14th-century Cathedral Church of 
Saint Michael was completely destroyed during the Coventry Blitz in 
1940,49 as well as Christ Church Greyfriars, which had been standing 
since medieval times.50  
However, more than the destruction of cultural property caught in the 
crossfires, World War II brought into focus the issue of looting cultural 
property in times of war.51 In particular, members of the Nazi party 
possessed a notorious and unique appetite for the fine arts, not only for 
personal collections, but as a tool to neutralize non-Germanic cultures.52 
Just a single Nazi confiscating agency reportedly “looted more than 
twenty-one thousand individual objects from over two hundred Jewish-
owned collections.”53 In Germany, pieces of new age art like cubism, 
modernism, and other abstract art, as well as pieces created by Jewish 
artists, were deemed “degenerate art” and slated for confiscation and 
destruction to “purify” German museums.54 The Nazi regime continued 
to plunder Europe throughout the war, including the infamous pillage of 
the Amber Room of the Catherine Palace near St. Petersburg.55 Countless  
  
 47. See, e.g., Bombing of Hiroshima, HIST. (Nov. 18, 2009), 
http://www.history.com/topics/world-war-ii/bombing-of-hiroshima-and-nagasaki. 
 48. See Amanda Mason, The Blitz Around Britain, IMPERIAL WAR MUSEUM (Jan. 
8, 2018), https://www.iwm.org.uk/history/the-blitz-around-britain. 
 49. See Coventry Cathedral, NEW CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA (2003), 
https://www.encyclopedia.com/religion/encyclopedias-almanacs-transcripts-and-
maps/coventry-cathedral.  
 50. See James Fawcett, 10 Historical and Cultural Sites Destroyed by War, 
LISTVERSE (Mar. 13, 2014), https://listverse.com/2014/03/13/10-historical-and-cultural-
sites-destroyed-by-war/. 
 51. See FORREST, supra note 29, at 74. 
 52. Anne Rothfeld, Nazi Looted Art, NAT’L ARCHIVES (2002), 
https://www.archives.gov/publications/prologue/2002/summer/nazi-looted-art-1.html. 
Nazis stole a variety of art, keeping many classic European pieces to themselves, while 
destroying pieces they saw as inferior. Id. 
 53. Id.  
 54. See id; Lucy Burns, Degenerate art: Why Hitler hated modernism, BBC 
NEWS (Nov. 6, 2013), https://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-24819441.  
 55. See KENNETH D. ALFORD, NAZI PLUNDER: GREAT TREASURE STORIES OF 
WORLD WAR II 195 (2000).  
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works of art were lost in this wartime plunder.56 Although many have 
been recovered through a mix of criminal investigation, restitution, and 
litigation,57 the Art Loss Register—the world’s largest database of stolen 
and missing art—still lists nearly 30,000 items missing from Nazi 
occupation.58 
In response to the rampant desolation of World War II, a group of 
nations came together to create a system of global protection for cultural 
heritage, signing the Hague Convention of 1954.59 The Convention 
focuses primarily on safeguarding and respecting cultural property 
during armed conflicts.60 It obliges member states to refrain from 
attacking or misappropriating cultural property, except out of military 
necessity, especially during military occupation.61 The convention also 
includes provisions prohibiting the export of movable cultural property 
during times of war.62 
Following this convention, a number of other international 
agreements further expanded global protection of cultural heritage 
property.63 For example, the Second Protocol to the Hague Convention 
provides for an enhanced protection status for certain sites to grant them 
immunity from military attack in conflicts.64 More importantly, the 
Second Protocol also specifies five serious criminal offenses related to  
 
  
 56. Alex Shoumatoff, The Devil and the Art Dealer, VANITY FAIR (Mar. 19, 
2014, 12:00 AM), https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2014/04/degenerate-art-cornelius-
gurlitt-munich-apartment.  
 57. See Carol Kino, Stolen Artworks and the Lawyers Who Reclaim Them, N.Y. 
TIMES (Mar. 28, 2007), https://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/28/arts/artsspecial/28law.html.  
 58. See Kharunya Paramaguru, The Top 10 Most Wanted Missing Art Works from 
World War II, TIME (Nov. 7, 2013), http://world.time.com/2013/11/07/the-top-10-most-
wanted-missing-art-works-from-world-war-ii/. See generally The Art Loss Register, 
http://www.artloss.com/en (last visited Oct. 17, 2018).  
 59. FORREST, supra note 29, at 78.  
 60. See First Protocol, supra note 27. 
 61. Id. at Art. 4.  
 62. Id.  
 63. See, e.g., Borodkin, supra note 3932, at 388–91.  
 64. UNESCO, Second Protocol to the Hague Convention of 1954 for the 
Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, art. 4, 10, 11 (Mar. 26, 
1999). 
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the destruction of cultural heritage property65 and obliges states to adopt 
domestic legislation reflecting this policy.66 The Second Protocol also 
allows for these offenses to be prosecuted under either domestic law or 
international tribunals67 such as the International Criminal Court.68 
Following the Hague Convention, the United Nations Educational, 
Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) passed a number of 
cultural heritage treaties to combat the illicit sale of cultural heritage 
objects and antiquities.69 The UNIDROIT Convention on the 
International Return of Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural Objects 
attempts to combat black market trade by asking buyers to verify the 
legitimacy of art purchases.70 The treaty dictates that if cultural property 
is stolen, any possessor must return the object71 and shall only be 
compensated if he or she can prove good faith and due diligence at the 
time of purchase.72 International and domestic databases on stolen 
artwork—such as the International Criminal Police Organization’s 
(Interpol) Stolen Works of Art Database— help courts and purchasers  
  
 65. Id. at art 15.  
1. Any person commits an offence within the meaning of this Protocol if that person 
intentionally and in violation of the Convention or this Protocol commits any of the 
following acts:  
a. making cultural property under enhanced protection the object of attack;  
b. using cultural property under enhanced protection or its immediate surroundings in 
support of military action;  
c. extensive destruction or appropriation of cultural property protected under the 
Convention and this Protocol;  
d. making cultural property protected under the Convention and this Protocol the object 
of attack;  
e. theft, pillage or misappropriation of, or acts of vandalism directed against cultural 
property protected under the Convention.  
 66. Id. at art. 16.  
 67. Id. at art. 17.  
 68. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Al Mahdi, ICC-01/12-01/15, Judgement and Sentence, 
¶¶ 10, 11 (Sept. 27, 2016). (convicting Al Mahd in the International Criminal Court in 
2016 for intentionally attacking historic monuments and religious buildings during war).  
 69. See, e.g., Borodkin, supra note 39, at 388–91. 
 70. See International Institute for the Unification of Private Law [UNIDROIT], 
Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural Objects, art. 4(4) (June 24, 1995).  
 71. Id. at art. 3(1).  
 72. Id. at art. 4(1).  
140 Michigan State International Law Review [Vol. 27.1 
 
assess the legitimacy of cultural heritage objects.73 The treaty also allows 
States to compel the return of an illegally exported cultural object, only 
compensating the possessor if he or she can demonstrate that he or she 
“neither knew nor ought reasonably to have known at the time of 
acquisition that the object had been illegally exported.”74  
These rules also apply to any items inherited by will or received as 
gifts, therefore encouraging museums and other institutions to check the 
credibility of donated objects.75 The convention limits the time period to 
bring a claim of restitution to three years from the time the claimant 
identified the location of the stolen work and the possessor, as long it is 
within fifty years from the time of theft.76 However, there are exceptions 
for archaeological sites or works belonging to a public collection.77 The 
largest drawback of this agreement is that it is interpreted as only 
applying to cultural property stolen or illegally exported after 1995, 
meaning a large part of looted artwork remains untouched by the treaty.78 
Despite increased global scrutiny and resolutions to offer protection 
for cultural heritage, cultural artifacts and heritage sites remain in danger 
today.79 Although the heartfelt preamble to the Hague Convention calls 
for the protection of property during conflict,80 war has offered a 
breeding ground for destruction, looting, and a spike in black market 
trade.81 For example, “[i]n the wake of US-led victories, the museums in 
Amara, Kirkuk, Mosul, Kufa, Diwaniya, Suleimaniya, Dohuk and Basra  
  
 73. See Database of Stolen Works of Art, INTERPOL, 
https://www.interpol.int/Crime-areas/Works-of-art/Database (last updated Mar. 01, 
2018). 
 74. UNIDROIT, supra note 68, at art. 6(1).  
 75. See generally id. at art. 4(5). 
 76. Id. at art. 3(3). 
 77. Id. at art. 3(4). 
 78. See Zsuzsanna Veres, The Fight Against Illicit Trafficking of Cultural 
Property: The 1970 UNESCO Convention and the 1995 UNIDROIT Convention, 12 
SANTA CLARA J. OF INT’L L. 2, 6–7 (2014).   
 79. See, e.g., FORREST, supra note 29, at 60–61 (noting that the American-Iranian 
conflict led to the destruction of cultural heritage sites despite treaties like UNESCO 
being in effect).  
 80. See First Protocol, supra note 27.  
 81. See, e.g., FORREST, supra note 29, at 60. 
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were extensively looted and vandalized. As many as 4,000 artefacts, 
some dating to 3,500 BC, were stolen, much of which subsequently 
entered the world’s art and antiquities market,” appearing for sale in 
markets like New York shortly after the invasion of Iraq.82 This is 
particularly disheartening because prior to the invasion, Iraq boasted 
“one of the strictest and most effective protection policies in the 
world.”83 Just as in World War II, global councils are responding to these 
threats,84 passing resolutions such as the United Nations Security 
Council’s Resolution 2199, which calls “for countries to take appropriate 
steps to prevent the trade in stolen Iraqi and Syrian cultural property.”85 
The resolution offers jurisdiction for enforcement to international 
organizations such as Interpol.86 
While the Le Guennecs were not collectors of artifacts pillaged from 
war-torn Iraqi museums or the beneficiaries of Nazi plunder, this 
historical framework is essential to understand why a couple like the Le 
Guennecs would come under such suspicion and face criminal sanctions 
for the possession of stolen artwork.87 Although this historical framework 
offers context for the existing institutions and schemes, the nature of 
black market art trade can only be truly understood by recognizing the 
economic incentives that drive it.  
III. ECONOMIC INCENTIVES  
A near perfect storm of access, scattered enforcement, and enormous 
profit margins makes black market art trade one of the most 
economically lucrative illicit trades in the world.88 The value of illicit art  
  
 82. Id. at 60, 63. 
 83. Id. at 60. 
 84. See, e.g., Borodkin, supra note 39, at 388–91. 
 85. See Security Council Res. Unanimous, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2199, at ¶ 17 (Feb. 
12, 2015); Works of Art, INTERPOL, https://www.interpol.int/Crime-areas/Works-of-
art/Works-of-art (last visited Jan. 28, 2018). 
 86. See Works of Art, supra note 85. 
 87. See Whitaker, supra note 1. 
 88. See Steven F. Grover, Note, The Need for Civil-Law Nations to Adopt 
Discovery Rules in Art Replevin Actions: A Comparative Study, 70 TEX. L. REV. 1431, 
1435 (1992). “Indeed, art theft is now estimated to be a one-to-two-billion-dollar-a-year 
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trade is estimated at $2-6 billion dollars per year,89 making it second only 
to drug trafficking.90 Three essential factors make this industry so 
economically lucrative: high demand for artifacts,91 ease of access,92 and 
limited regulations in trafficking.93 
First, scholars and anthropologists are not the only ones who 
recognize the significance of cultural heritage objects;94 private collectors 
recognize that these objects have immense worth, both culturally and 
economically,95 and are willing to pay handsomely for them.96 For 
example, Johannes Vermeer’s painting, The Concert, was stolen in 1990 
and is valued at £130 million, meaning that not even a £3.2 million 
reward is enough to draw it off the black market.97 Another example is 
Abu Sayyaf, who was in charge of dealing smuggled antiquities for  
 
 
  
business – second only to drug trafficking as the most profitable form of illegal trade.” 
Id. 
 89. See BLAKE, supra note 20, at 24.  
 90. See Grover, supra note 88, at 1435. 
 91. See, e.g., JANET ULPH & IAN SMITH, THE ILLICIT TRADE IN ART AND 
ANTIQUITIES: INTERNATIONAL RECOVERY AND CRIMINAL AND CIVIL LIABILITY 3 (2012). 
“An insatiable demand amongst collectors for certain types of antiquities has driven up 
prices and has led to extensive looting.” Id. 
 92. See e.g., Ed Caesar, What is the Value of Stolen Art?, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 13, 
2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/17/magazine/what-is-the-value-of-stolen-
art.html (explaining how “a couple of men wearing hoods” were able to break into a 
museum at three in the morning and walk out with priceless art); see also Jim Michaels, 
Demand Still High for ISIL’s Stolen Antiquities from Palmyra, Elsewhere, USA TODAY 
(Mar. 31, 2016), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2016/03/31/demand-still-
high-isils-stolen-antiquities-palmyra-elsewhere/82476346/. In fact, the internet has only 
made it easier to market stolen items. Id.  
 93. See generally, CHECHI, supra note 35, at 139–40.  
 94. See Alice Vincent, The 10 Most-Wanted Missing or Stolen Paintings, THE 
TELEGRAPH (Apr. 13, 2016), https://www.telegraph.co.uk/art/what-to-see/the-most-
wanted-missing-paintings/. 
 95. See id. 
 96. See, e.g., Allyssia Alleyne, Picasso Painting Stolen by Nazis Sells for $45 
Million, CNN (May 16, 2017), https://www.cnn.com/style/article/picasso-stolen-by-
nazis-sells-for-45-million/index.html. 
 97. Id.  
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ISIS—his meticulous records show profits from the trade in the hundreds 
of millions of dollars.98  
To these collectors (and many scholars), cultural heritage items like 
“coins, pottery shards, sculptural fragments, textiles, [art,] and tools of 
ancient cultures are economically marketable.”99 Some collectors argue 
that placing such articles in the free market may encourage “mutual 
understanding and respect” among different cultures and might preserve 
the artifacts better than if they had been left undisturbed.100 In fact, many 
scholars argue that the true value of cultural heritage can only be 
accessed if it is visible and accessible to the public, where the lessons of 
the past can influence present and future generations.101 However, there 
are thousands of collectors on the black market preying on cultural 
heritage objects, removing far more objects than can be justified for 
educational purposes.102 For example, an estimated “95% of 
archeological sites in Belize may have been destroyed by looting.”103 
These collectors are taking advantage of looting, war, and outright theft 
to get their hands on great works of art that will be passed from hand to 
hand in private collections, forever lost to the world at large.104 
Perhaps the largest component of what makes illicit art trade so 
lucrative is the ease of access the enterprise offers.105 Cultural heritage 
items are extremely pervasive and often very minute, making it 
extremely difficult for countries to properly police cultural heritage 
artifacts, especially as they transfer into the hands of private dealers for  
  
 98. See Margaret Brennan, ISIS Cashing in on Selling Plundered Antiquities to 
Fund Terror, CBS NEWS (Sept. 29, 2015, 7:10 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/isis-
relying-on-smuggling-antiquities-to-fund-terror/. 
 99. See Borodkin, supra note 39, at 409. 
 100. Id. “For example, apologists for British ownership of the Elgin Marbles 
frequently point out that those fragments of the Parthenon are better preserved than their 
counterparts at the Acropolis, due to air pollution in Athens.” Id. 
 101. See FORREST, supra note 29, at 5. 
 102. Borodkin, supra note 39, at 383. 
 103. See BLAKE, supra note 20, at 25. 
 104. See supra pp. 10–13. 
 105. See, e.g., Caesar, supra note 92 (describing that “a couple of men wearing 
hoods” were able to break into a museum and make off with two drawings and a number 
of paintings).   
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years or even generations.106 The system broadly takes advantage of easy 
opportunity and organized transactions that allow for wide profit 
margins.107 Typically, the theft of a cultural heritage item is highly 
orchestrated, with middlemen paying a small fee to a local looter to find 
an artifact, then retaining over 98% of final market price.108 The risk of 
penalty for trafficking stolen antiquities gives local looters a high 
incentive to convert stolen items into quick cash.109 Given government 
prohibitions against exporting such goods, the risk allows the middlemen 
to pay the “finders” a fraction of the item’s market worth, letting the 
finder off with a small fee, then exporting the item to be sold at auction 
for a hundred times the cost.110 Take for example the Petén region of 
Central America: a looter may be paid $200-$500 for each vessel taken 
from an ancient site, but the middlemen will ultimately sell the piece at 
auction for $100,000.111 Similarly, a famer in southwest Turkey sold a 
Roman table-leg depicting Marsyas being flayed by Apollo for $7,500, 
and the dealer re-sold the piece in New York for $540,000.112 
Of course, not all art theft comes about from such small-scale 
organized looting operations; some of the most valuable pieces are stolen 
in egregious heists.113 For example, in December 2002, two thieves broke 
into the Vincent van Gogh Museum in Amsterdam and made off with 
two paintings valued at £25 million.114 Even more devastating, in 1990, 
two men disguised as police officers made their way into the Isabella 
Stewart Gardner Museum and left with an estimated $500 million worth 
of art, including masterpieces by Rembrandt, Vermeer, Manet, and  
 
 
  
 106. See generally BLAKE, supra note 20, at 23. 
 107. See Borodkin, supra note 39, at 410–11. 
 108. See BLAKE, supra note 20, at 26.  
 109. See Borodkin, supra note 39, at 410–11. 
 110. Id. at 378. “Typically, middlemen retain most of the profits in the antiquities 
black market, while the finders of artifacts often receive less than one percent of the retail 
value of their discoveries.” Id. 
 111. BLAKE, supra note 20, at 26. 
 112. Id.  
 113. See, e.g., Caesar, supra note 92.   
 114. See Vincent, supra note 94.  
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Degas.115 Compared with the other, more lucrative criminal enterprises of 
drug smuggling and arms distribution, the fact that two men disguised as 
police officers could walk out of a building with $500 million worth of 
art makes art theft arguably one of the easiest criminal enterprises in the 
world.116  
Of course, stolen artwork and antiquities are only valuable insofar as 
they can be sold for profit.117 However, “[a]s long as there is a belief 
among criminals in the enduring willingness of parties from the 
legitimate art world to retrieve their property, a stolen painting has 
currency.”118 While it is true that a high-profile painting like the stolen 
Degas will not be able to reach its full value because it does not have full 
access to reputable dealers, there are tremendous profits to be made in 
the dealing of stolen cultural artifacts.119 Unfortunately, the current 
systems in place to deal with these problems are scattered, making the 
enterprise even more lucrative.120 Even with international treaties guiding 
these issues, illicit art trade is most often dealt with domestically, 
creating problems with jurisdiction, enforcement of foreign judgments, 
access to litigation, and choice of law, among others.121 With such a 
scattered system in place, although there are an estimated 45,000 to  
 
 
 
 
  
 115. See Shelley Murphy & Stephen Kurkjian, Six Theories Behind the Stolen 
Gardner Museum Paintings, BOS. GLOBE (Mar. 18, 2017), 
https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2017/03/18/six-theories-behind-stolen-gardner-
museum-paintings/JmwHou86qo5MtBzX1fb9cI/story.html.  
 116. See generally id.  
 117. See Caesar, supra note 92.   
 118. Alex Mayyasi, How Do You Make Money Off Stolen Art?, PRICEONOMICS 
(Nov. 21, 2013), https://priceonomics.com/how-do-you-make-money-off-stolen-art/. See 
also Caesar, supra note 92.   
 119. See generally Grover, supra note 88, at 1435. 
 120. See e.g., CHECHI, supra note 35, at 139–40. Chechi discusses access to 
litigation, but other “systems” include criminal sanctions, alternative dispute resolution, 
private auction, etc. Id. 
 121. See id. at 139-142. 
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53,000 art thefts per year throughout the world,122 “only about ten 
percent of all stolen art is ever recovered.”123 
IV. CURRENT DETERRENCE SCHEMES  
A. International Conventions 
Countries are attempting to combat this issue at a global scale by 
joining treaties and protocols such as the Hague Convention or the 
UNESCO treaties.124 Interpol plays one of the most aggressive roles in 
protecting global cultural heritage, not only retaining its own team of 
investigating agents who enforce cultural heritage law, but also 
maintaining a critical database of stolen or missing art.125 This proves to 
be an effective tool, as identifying artwork as stolen places scrutiny on 
the work, severely limiting the dealers and auctions at which the work 
can be sold, therefore limiting its value.126 
On a criminal front, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia has handed down multiple criminal convictions for the “post-
1991 destruction and profanation of mosques, churches and other sites of 
educational, religious, and cultural relevance.”127 The tribunal also made 
it clear that intentionally targeting the cultural assets of a culturally 
distinct group constituted a crime against humanity as persecution with a 
discriminatory intent.128  
However, like many international treaties, most of the doctrines offer 
limited enforcement power for issues in dispute.129 For example, WTO 
members are obliged to first attempt to settle their disputes without  
 
  
 122. Grover, supra note 88, at 1439. “With between 45,000 and 
53,000 art thefts taking place throughout the world every year, it is no exaggeration to 
say that art theft has reached epidemic proportions.” Id. 
 123. Id.  
 124. See Borodkin, supra note 39, at 388–91. 
 125. See generally Works of Art, supra note 85.  
 126. Id. 
 127. CHECHI, supra note 35, at 153.  
 128. See id.  
 129. See id. at 154. 
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litigation through channels such as conciliation or arbitration,130 but if 
they fail to come to an agreement, the complaining party is entitled to 
request a panel.131 Additionally, parties to a dispute “may seek judicial 
settlement by submitting the dispute to a standing international tribunal 
with its own rules on jurisdictional competence and procedure.”132 Other 
international systems offer slightly more enforcement power.133 For 
example, the International Court of Justice can offer binding decisions on 
cultural heritage property disputes among States using international 
law.134 For instance, under the United Kingdom Rules of Civil Procedure, 
any non-complying states can face sanctions.135 While these systems are 
essential in the effort to limit illicit art trade, they unfortunately have a 
mixed effect.136 International disputes lead to a host of complications, 
such as issues of jurisdiction, choice of law provisions, evidence, and the 
excessive cost of litigation.137  
B. Domestic Conventions 
The majority of art and cultural heritage control is handled through 
domestic regulations.138 One of the most common tactics is to implement 
stringent import and export laws to catch black market artifacts in 
transit.139 Artifact-rich states often implement “umbrella” licensing 
schemes that often require certification for dealers in antiquities that fall 
under the umbrella.140 However, these schemes are often difficult to  
  
 130. See id. at 138. 
 131. See id.  
 132. Id. at 146.  
 133. See id.  
 134. See id. at 147. 
 135. See Norman Palmer, Litigation: The Best Remedy?, in RESOLUTION OF 
CULTURAL PROPERTY DISPUTES 265, 268 (The Int’l Bureau of the Permanent Court of 
Arbitration ed., 2003). 
 136. See, e.g., id.  
 137. See CHECHI, supra note 35, at 139–42. 
 138. CHECHI, supra note 35, at 138. “The initiation of legal proceedings before 
domestic courts is the main avenue for the settlement of the majority of transnational 
cases, including those involving cultural assets.” Id. 
 139. BLAKE, supra note 20, at 31–32. 
 140. See id. at 29.  
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enforce, as customs officers may lack the expertise to identify illicit 
cultural property trade or may even turn a blind eye to it.141 In some 
cases, these export controls are not required by law, but are informal 
industry practice.142 For example, in the United Kingdom, museums self-
regulate the trade and sale of art within their industry, imposing 
voluntary certification programs and ethical codes for parties to follow.143 
Many countries also follow the lead of Interpol, maintaining databases 
of stolen artwork and creating special task forces to investigate and deter 
art theft and illicit trade.144 For example, a special branch of the Italian 
Carabinieri called The Carabinieri Command for Protection of Italy’s 
Cultural Heritage (Carabinieri T.P.C.) is responsible for combatting the 
illicit sale and theft of art and antiquities in Italy.145 Similarly, in the 
United States, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has a special 
division for Art Theft and Property Crimes and maintains a national 
database on stolen art called The National Stolen Art File (NSAF).146 
Finally, some States implement laws specifically directed at the 
preservation of cultural heritage.147 Title 3.4 of the Dutch Civil Code has 
specific provisions for the protection of cultural heritage, including 
mandating a due diligence standard at the acquisition of a cultural 
object.148 Canada has a number of national cultural property acts such as  
  
 141. Id. at 30. 
 142. See id. at 33–34. 
 143. Id. at 33–35. 
 144. Specialized Police Forces, UNESCO, 
http://www.unesco.org/new/en/culture/themes/illicit-trafficking-of-cultural-
property/partnerships/specialized-police-forces/ (last visited Mar. 03, 2018).  
 145. See Sylvia Poggioli, For Italy’s Art Police, An Ongoing Fight Against Pillage 
of Priceless Works, NPR (Jan. 11, 2017), 
https://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2017/01/11/508031006/for-italys-art-police-an-
ongoing-fight-against-pillage-of-priceless-works; Jenny Starrs, Special Squad of Italian 
Police Crack Case of Verona Museum Theft, Arrest 13 Suspects, THE WASHINGTON POST 
(Mar. 17, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-
mix/wp/2016/03/17/special-squad-of-italian-art-police-crack-case-of-verona-museum-
theft-arrest-13-suspects/?utm_term=.36fc6edfc96e.     
 146. Art Theft, FBI, https://www.fbi.gov/investigate/violent-crime/art-theft (last 
visited Mar. 03, 2018).  
 147. See, e.g., BLAKE, supra note 20, at 31–32.  
 148. Art. 3:87a paras 1-3, BW (Neth.); Art. 3:86a paras 1-4, BW (Neth.). 
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the Cultural Property Export and Import Act,149 and the United States has 
implemented the 1972 Pre-Columbian Art Act, which bans the import of 
pre-Columbian artifacts from Mexico into the United States unless the 
country of origin certifies that the importation of the artifact does not 
violate any of the origin country’s laws.150 Many of these statutes provide 
for specific criminal sanctions for anyone in possession of stolen 
artifacts.151 For example, the Canadian Cultural Property Export and 
Import Act “makes it an offence for a Canadian citizen or resident to 
unlawfully remove cultural objects” from any member state of the 
Second Hague Protocol.152 Other countries rely on more generic 
provisions in their own domestic codes to protect cultural property.153 For 
example, France relied on the provision of its penal code dealing with the 
possession of stolen goods to handle the Le Guennec case.154 
Regardless of whether domestic laws handle cultural property 
implicitly or explicitly, there are a number of issues that come with 
relying on domestic courts.155 On one hand, courts allow for definitive 
decisions that can be clearly enforced, often establishing legal precedents 
through common law or inspiring statutes in both common law and civil 
law jurisdictions.156 This is particularly useful in cases where the 
legislature lacks the expertise to handle these sorts of issues.157 However, 
relying on domestic policies also presents a number of problems—
chiefly among them are issues of jurisdiction.158 Complainants often have 
little control over how a case can be heard and are limited to laws that 
can vary dramatically from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.159 Domestic  
  
 149. Cultural Property Export and Import Act, R.S.C. 1985, c C-51 (Can.). 
 150. Importation of Pre-Columbian Monumental or Architectural 
Sculpture or Murals, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2091–2092 (1972).   
 151. See, e.g., CHECHI, supra note 35, at 141 n.375.   
 152. Id.  
 153. See generally id. at 139.  
 154. See Rosnoblet, supra note 10; CODE PÉNAL [C. PÉN.] [PENAL CODE] art. 321-1 
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 155. See CHECHI, supra note 35, at 139–42. 
 156. See id. at 139-140.  
 157. See generally id.  
 158. Id. at 140.  
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judges often lack the expertise to deal with issues of art theft properly, 
and though domestic courts can implement a clear decision,160 
enforcement of that decision is often shorthanded due to jurisdictional 
issues.161 Furthermore, because cultural heritage objects like art are so 
easy to move and the laws so complex, there are often evidentiary issues, 
as it becomes difficult to prove that a defendant removed objects before a 
given time with full knowledge of that country’s export laws.162 Overall, 
while domestic conventions offer more direct enforcement of cultural 
heritage issues than international schemes, they are still faced with a 
litany of problems.163 
V. ANALYSIS: IS THERE A SYSTEM THAT WORKS? 
Regardless of whether the illicit trade of cultural heritage objects is 
governed by international treaties or domestic legislation, as with any 
crime, the system is controlled by a balance of economic incentive and 
deterrence from criminal or civil penalties.164 Like any organized crime 
scheme, for some, the vast economic incentive largely eclipses the risk of 
such penalties.165 However, this note focuses not on stemming the trade 
of black market art from the source, but on encouraging the return of 
already stolen property.166 What balance of economic incentive would 
encourage someone like Pierre Le Guennec to come forward with their  
 
  
 160. Id. at 143. 
 161. Id. at 142.  
 162. See e.g., id. “Since more than half a century has passed since the Second 
World War, evidence is now lost or extremely difficult to collect. While many of those 
involved have passed away, those who are alive or their descendants may have no 
documentation, photos, or witnesses, and statements taken from witnesses such a long 
time after the event are not always fully reliable.”  
 163. See id. at 139–42. 
 164. See generally ROBERT D. COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW & ECONOMICS 454-
56 (6th ed. 2011). 
 165. Borodkin, supra note 39, at 378.  
 166. See Whitaker, supra note 1. For example, the Le Guennecs did not purchase 
the Picasso sketches from a black market art dealer, they came to possess the art without 
ever being involved in black market trade. Id. 
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Picasso sketches?167 What will it take to encourage someone to come 
forward with an antiquity looted from the Baghdad museum?168 Is the 
stick of deterrence enough, or must there be a carrot to coax these pieces 
out from hiding?  
This section analyzes two simple factors: whether to maintain 
criminal or civil sanctions as deterrence,169 and whether to offer an 
economic incentive for the return of stolen art or antiquities.170 The 
combination of these factors can be broken down into four discrete 
models: deterrence without economic incentive, deterrence with 
economic incentive, amnesty without economic incentive, and amnesty 
with economic incentive. While there are no concrete systems in place 
that offer all of these models clearly, a mix of formal systems and 
informal agreements reveal that each these models are already in play to 
some degree.171 Although there is no clear model that fully reveals lost 
work while discouraging black market trade, a balance of limited 
amnesty and economic incentive appears to be appropriate to encourage 
the return of stolen art and antiquities from private collectors.172 
  
 167. See id. (discussing Le Guennec wanting to sell the sketches to fund a 
surgery). 
 168. See, e.g., FORREST, supra note 29, at 63.  
 169. Such as the French criminal sanction for possessing stolen goods. CODE 
PÉNAL [C. PÉN.] [PENAL CODE] art. 321-1 (Fr.). 
 170. See Borodkin, supra note 39, at 406–07. This could come in the form of 
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repatriation of missing works). 
 171. See Carl Franzen, Ill-Gotten Gains: How Many Museums Have Stolen 
Objects in Their Collections?, THE VERGE (May 13, 2013), 
https://www.theverge.com/2013/5/13/4326306/museum-artifacts-looted-repatriation 
(discussing museums informal negotiations to get stolen pieces returned without risk of 
criminal penalties). 
 172. Mayyasi, supra note 118. This model is how many institutions negotiate the 
return of lost art. and what encouraged Pierre Le Guennec to come forward with the 
Picasso sketches. Id.; see Whitaker, supra note 1. 
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A. Deterrence Without Economic Incentive 
The first response model is to strictly impose criminal or civil 
penalties for anyone found in possession of stolen cultural property while 
eliminating all economic incentive.173 France followed this model in the 
Le Guennec case, confiscating the Picasso sketches, allowing the Le 
Gennecs to retain none of the economic value of the pieces, and charging 
them criminally with possession of stolen goods.174 This model is the 
harshest response to the illicit art trade, offering no incentive and 
creating a system of pure deterrence.175 Many of the existing legal 
systems follow this pure deterrence model and have enacted statutes that 
outline clear criminal penalties and the confiscation of illicit goods.176  
Those in favor of this model support that it sends a clear message: those 
engaged in the illicit art trade will face consequences and reap no 
rewards.177 This no-tolerance policy for black market trade not only puts 
perpetrators on alert, but also sends a clear message across the 
international community that individual countries and international 
organizations are taking this problem seriously.178 At an individual level, 
this method deters casual buyers who view the risk of punishment as far 
outweighing the gamble of a reward.179 This method is an effective tool 
to cut off black market trade at its head, as the cost of being involved in 
an illicit trade will shame buyers and decrease the demand for the 
market, thereby discouraging further supply.180  
  
 173. See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, U.S. Seeks Warrant to Seize 
Ring Trafficked by ISIS (Dec. 06, 2017) (available at https://www.justice.gov/usao-
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For example, the U.S. FBI will seize illicitly imported art and antiquities and charge the 
possessors criminally. Id.   
 174. Rosnoblet, supra note 10. 
 175. For a discussion of the deterrence principle, see Ronald L. Akers, Rational 
Choice, Deterrence, and Social Learning Theory in Criminology: The Path Not Taken, 
81 J. CRIM. L & CRIMINOLOGY 653, 654 (1990).  
 176. See, e.g., Cultural Property Export and Import Act, R.S.C. 1985, c C-51 §§37 
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 177. See BLAKE, supra note 20, at 30–31.  
 178. See id. at 39–31. 
 179. See id.  
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2018] Raiders of the Lost Art 153 
 
However, at the cost of sending a clear message to larger criminal 
enterprises and new buyers who are perpetuating further illicit trade, this 
method also deters existing collectors from coming forward with their art 
collections.181 Christopher A. Marinello, an attorney who has dedicated 
his life to recovering stolen works of art, notes that “[i]t is rare that a 
possessor willingly returns stolen artwork without asking for a reward or 
some kind of remuneration.”182 In other words, those in knowing 
possession of a stolen work will rarely, if ever, come forward without 
some form of economic incentive, particularly if the only reward they 
will face is a potential prison sentence.183  
While the pure deterrence method sends a message to those seeking to 
engage on the black market, it also sends a clear message to those 
already in possession to stay in hiding.184 Even Pierre Le Guennec 
troublingly noted that if he had known he would have faced a criminal 
conviction for bringing the Picasso sketches forward, he would have 
burned the pieces.185 Furthermore, under Italian law, major artworks and 
private collections must be offered for sale to the government before 
private collectors and cannot be transferred without the permission of 
local government.186 Such a strict provision offers direct control on the 
movement of art pieces, but simultaneously encourages collectors to 
keep important works unlisted or concealed.187 
  
 181. See, e.g., Whitaker, supra note 1. Le Guennec reported that he would have 
rather burned the Picasso works than be faced with criminal sanctions. Id. Harsh Italian 
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 185. Whitaker, supra note 1. 
 186. See Stefano Pirovano, Long Overdue Revolution in Italian Fine Art Export 
Law is About to Happen, CONCEPTUAL FINE ARTS (Apr. 10, 2017), 
https://www.conceptualfinearts.com/cfa/2017/04/10/long-overdue-revolution-in-italian-
fine-art-export-law-is-about-to-be-happen/; Maud Appleton Hartwell, The Expatriation of 
Italian Works of Art, PERRY MAG., Feb. 1902, at 210, 213; Frank Jewett Mather Jr., 
Safeguarding the Art Treasures of Italy, 191 N. AM. R. 105, 105 (1910).  
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Nothing about the pure deterrence method encourages collectors to 
come forward with art, meaning the only remaining method is to rely on 
task forces such as Interpol188 or the FBI to investigate and smoke out the 
missing pieces.189  While such methods do allow for the recovery of 
major thefts, many recovered pieces come to the market through sale or 
litigation,190 meaning that small-scale buyers can easily slip through the 
cracks.  Overall, the pure deterrence system only encourages pieces of 
stolen artwork and antiquities to remain lost to the world, or worse, 
destroyed.191  
B. Deterrence With Economic Incentive 
Given that the economic incentives in dealing black market antiquities 
is so high,192 a possible alternative to the pure deterrence model would be 
to allow sellers to retain their economic incentives, but still maintain 
criminal or civil sanctions against them. The major caveat with this 
model is that the economic incentive would have to substantially 
outweigh the price of the criminal or civil sanctions.193 However, this 
system is largely how the black market already operates.194 For actors on 
the black market, this system is clearly effective, as the trade is highly 
profitable and low-risk—the exports and imports are more difficult to 
detect than something like narcotics,195 the laws governing this trade are 
often inconsistent and confusing,196 the penalties are typically low,197 and 
the majority of the risk is shifted onto low-paid thieves looting the art 
and antiquities at the ground level.198 The other issue is that many of 
these smuggling operations are run by organized crime syndicates, who  
  
 188. See, e.g., Database of Stolen Works of Art, supra note 73.  
 189. See Art Theft, supra note 146.  
 190. See e.g., Caesar, supra note 92.   
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 192. See Borodkin, supra note 39, at 378.  
 193. See Akers, supra note 175, at 654.  
 194. See generally ULPH & SMITH, supra note 91, at 3.  
 195. See generally Borodkin, supra note 39, at 407. 
 196. See generally BLAKE, supra note 20, at 30.  
 197. See, e.g., Rosnoblet, supra note 10. 
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2018] Raiders of the Lost Art 155 
 
already make a living off illicit trade.199 For example, Martin Cahill, an 
Irish mobster, traded a painting stolen from the Beit Collection in 
exchange for heroin in Istanbul.200 For organized crime syndicates, the 
deterrence of strict criminalization does not outweigh the economic 
incentive of smuggling art, but rather, it is merely another business 
expense.201 
Of course, one of the major issues with organized crime is that the 
trade channels of the black market are limited.202 Part of the frustration of 
owning even a highly valuable piece on the black market is that there are 
limited opportunities to turn that asset into profit.203 Opening up 
reputable trade channels could encourage possessors to come forward 
from the pure incentive of being able to sell their stolen goods on a wider 
market.204 UNIDROIT has a policy in place under 19 U.S.C. 1595a(c), 
which “balances compulsory repatriation with financial compensation for 
bona fide purchasers” by allowing a bona fide purchaser to maintain the 
economic incentive of bringing stolen art forward via reasonable 
financial compensation while maintaining the penalty of mandatory 
repatriation of the artwork.205 This policy could be expanded to knowing 
possessors of stolen artifacts whose work would be mandatorily 
repatriated, but with the benefit of fixed financial compensation.206  
The draw of being able to get rid of a piece for a smaller profit in 
exchange for a more immediate sale may be enough to encourage pieces 
out of hiding and back into the reputable world.207 This model is not  
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isolated, as there have “been calls made for liberating the trade in art as a 
means of reducing the amount of illicitly trafficked items by making 
more legitimate art and antiquities available to dealers and buyers.”208 
Although this position is “strongly resisted by those who favour more 
protectionist approaches,”209 it could offer some clear incentives, 
particularly for those individuals who are already in possession of stolen 
art or antiquities.  
Organized crime syndicates aside, this model could create a balance 
between discouraging criminal activity and encouraging sellers to come 
forward.210 However, this only works if the economic incentive 
outweighs the cost of the penalty, which becomes less and less likely at a 
smaller scale.211 For a small actor like Pierre Le Guennec, the economic 
incentive of selling the Picasso collection was not worth the price of the 
criminal sanction.212 The economic incentive drew the works out of their 
forty-year hiding in the first place,213 but given that Le Guennec was so 
scarred by his brief stay in jail that he had to seek therapy,214 the 
economic incentive does not substantially outweigh the cost of the 
experience. Overall, it seems unlikely that an average layperson would 
generally subject himself to such harsh penalties, even to keep profit.215 
C. Amnesty Without Economic Incentive 
Shifting away from the threat of deterrence, another model would be 
to grant amnesty to possessors of stolen art while refraining from  
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offering any economic incentive. Unfortunately, as discussed above, 
without any economic incentive, there is little to encourage owners from 
coming forward with potentially stolen art.216 However, this has not 
stopped a select few organizations from trying.217 For example, a group 
of art enthusiasts formed the group Friends of Art to purchase visual art 
pieces for Pittsburg Public Schools.218 Many of the works were stolen, 
and the group offered a public promise of amnesty from any criminal 
charges for anyone would return the lost pieces.219 More controversially, 
many museums, such as the New York Museum of Metropolitan Art 
have been accused of accepting stolen works,220 and have even 
repatriated some looted pieces.221 Although the museum promised to 
investigate their collections, few pieces have been returned.222  
For a small collector like Pierre Le Guennec, if he was given the 
choice in retrospect, he would likely have been happy to take such a deal 
as opposed to his criminal sentence.223 However, given that Le Guennec 
only removed the sketches from his garage due to the incentive of 
gaining money for an upcoming surgery, it seems unlikely that he would 
have come forward comforted only by the fact that he would not go to 
prison.224 While a charitable spirit or even a guilty conscience may drive 
some collectors to bring lost works back to the public eye, mere amnesty  
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does not seem enough to coax collectors to act.225 Even with the stick of 
deterrence gone, without any sort of carrot to encourage collectors to act, 
the works will remain lost to private collections.226  
D. Amnesty With Economic Incentive 
The final model is the option of offering amnesty while allowing 
collectors to maintain the economic incentives of selling their stolen art 
or antiquities.227 This is the most liberal approach, offering a pure reward 
model228 in contrast to the pure deterrence model.229 As discussed above, 
opening the market of stolen antiquities to legitimate dealers and buyers 
would increase the forums in which black market art could be sold.230 
This, in turn, would encourage collectors to bring stolen works to 
auction, prompting more and more lost pieces to be recovered and 
returned to the world at large.231  
However, critics of this model point out that this system is likely to 
encourage black market trade, in stark opposition to many State’s 
protectionist approaches.232 With more legitimate avenues of sale open to 
vendors, the market can expand to the rising demands of purchasers who 
are willing to buy in reputable markets.233 With no risk of criminal or 
civil penalties and full economic advantage to be gained, the already 
lucrative trade of black market art and antiquities would easily 
skyrocket.234 Implementing such a system sends a message of tolerance 
to these criminals, encouraging more looting behavior to keep up with 
profitable demands, especially when there is no deterrence to stop  
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them.235 So, while a pure incentive system encourages the return of 
already lost pieces, it also encourages the further looting and destruction 
of cultural heritage sites.236 
While this model seems to unreasonably and explicitly encourage 
black market trade, in practice, it is surprisingly more common than the 
cost would suggest.237 For many reputable collectors like museums, 
under-the-table negotiations can be the easiest and most expedient way to 
have stolen artifacts returned.238 For example, the Tate Gallery in London 
reportedly paid an attorney $5.6 million to negotiate the return of stolen 
paintings,239 and thieves often demand ransom fees for the safe return of 
stolen pieces.240  
In addition, in many legal systems, it is fairly simple to obtain titles 
for stolen works of art.241 For example, in the Netherlands, title will be 
given to one in possession of a cultural heritage artifact so long as the 
possessor can demonstrate reasonable due diligence in finding whether 
the piece has reputable title.242 Furthermore, even if a stolen piece is 
discovered, the process of litigation and repatriation is lengthy, 
expensive, and fraught with issues.243 This gives true owners an incentive 
to negotiate a quiet deal, often opting to pay a nominal fee for the safe 
and swift return of the piece.244 Therefore, despite the public image of 
reputable institutions ardently refusing to negotiate with thieves, in  
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practice, it is often a more practical solution than relying on a slow-
moving and scattered court system.245  
While this model strongly encourages organized black market 
schemes, for the smaller collector like Le Guennec, it is the perfect 
model to drive lost pieces out of hiding.246 The Picasso pieces were only 
recovered in the Le Guennec case because the Le Guennecs believed 
they were opting into this system—Pierre Le Guennec never anticipated 
criminal penalties and was going to use any profits from auction to pay 
for an upcoming surgery.247 Therefore, although this method undoubtedly 
promulgates the spread of black market art trade and the further 
destruction of cultural heritage sites and art theft, it is simultaneously the 
best system to encourage private collectors to come forward and return 
missing pieces back to the world stage.248 However, this begs the 
question: is there a way to limit this system to encourage these private 
collectors without sacrificing all deterrence against black market trade?   
E. Proposal: Limited Amnesty With Limited Economic Incentive 
While each of the four proposed models offers its own benefits and 
consequences, there is no model that offers a clear solution to all 
problems.249 Rather, a middle ground approach should be used to 
encourage these smaller scale collectors to come forward with stolen 
pieces.250 Given the above analysis, a grant of amnesty with economic 
incentive is the best way to encourage the return of lost pieces to the 
world stage.251 However, in the interest of curbing encouragement of the 
black market, these provisions of amnesty and economic incentive  
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should be limited to those who meet certain criteria. In theory, offering 
amnesty only if goods are sold or donated to specific reputable dealers 
and enforcing a cap on the economic incentive could be an effective 
method to accomplish this goal.   
One way to place limitations on a grant of amnesty for criminally 
possessing stolen goods would be to offer it only to those who sell or 
donate to select reputable dealers. These dealers are more likely to 
expose the lost pieces to the public, rather than move them into private 
hands.252 For example, a public museum or university can put pieces of 
art and antiquities on display to educate the public and preserve cultural 
heritage, accomplishing the larger goals of treaties like the Hague 
Convention.253 Offering amnesty incentives for collectors to sell to these 
institutions expands the market to reputable sources, but does not open 
the floodgates enough to offer a significant expansion to the black 
market.254 Although this proposal conflicts with many museums’ 
missions to curb black market art and only showcase legitimate pieces, 
this also serves the larger goal of encouraging more lost pieces to 
surface.255 
Selling to these limited organizations would also allow the entities to 
control the economic incentives offered to these sellers. For example, if a 
collector in possession of a stolen work tries to sell to a museum where 
he or she will be offered amnesty, the museum could cap the offer at 5% 
of the piece’s market value.256 As discussed above, even selling a piece 
for a fraction of its market worth is often a better alternative for sellers 
than sitting on the asset for decades, particularly as the limited market for  
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stolen artwork means pieces only sell for an average of 7% to 10% of 
open-market value.257 
Each institution should have the authority to negotiate the amount of 
an offer, but a group like UNESCO could recommend a general cap to 
ensure the practice is not encouraging black market trade. While this 
approach may not work for multi-million dollar pieces, it could be 
effective for cultural heritage objects on a smaller scale.258 Once again, 
this would open sellers to legitimate channels of trade, but the capped 
costs would help control the otherwise unwieldy profit margins.259 
Legitimizing the trade might also encourage sellers to utilize reputable 
avenues of trade, favoring a clean sale for less profit over a higher price 
with an increased risk of criminal penalty.260 
Of course, this system could lead to an influx of litigation seeking 
repatriation of stolen pieces, particularly for member countries of 
agreements like the Hague Convention that mandate the return of stolen 
art.261 However, at the expense of increased litigation, there is the 
potential to gain priceless cultural value in seeing the return of missing 
pieces.262 Unfortunately, while the preservation of art, culture, and 
history is the driving force of these institutions, the sentiment is idyllic in 
comparison to the reality of running a business.263 The only true way this 
system could work is for museums to value the return of missing pieces 
over the cost of litigation, negotiation, and repatriation.264 Short of 
donations from private patrons or increased State funding, how to 
balance the value and cost of recovering stolen art and antiquities is a 
decision that must be made by the industry itself.265  
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VI. CONCLUSION 
Despite the tremendous strides that have been made to combat the 
loss of cultural heritage artifacts, the black market trade of art and 
antiquities remains a global problem.266 As long as there is demand on 
the market, the looting and sale of these items will continue to provide a 
lucrative trade.267 While current international and domestic conventions 
are working to combat this issue, they largely focus on on-going looting, 
imports, and exports, and are largely ineffective against collectors who 
are already in possession of stolen art and antiquities.268 Pierre Le 
Guennec is not the only one in possession of stolen art, but under the 
current regimes, there is nothing to encourage collectors to come forward 
with stolen artifacts.269 Common deterrence models only persuade these 
collectors to remain hidden.270 Despite the argument that it would 
exacerbate black market art trade, granting these collectors limited 
amnesty and economic incentive would encourage more lost art to be 
returned to the public stage.271 Opening the black market to select 
reputable avenues of trade would draw these pieces out of hiding through 
legitimate sale.272 Although this model presents a host of challenges, 
relying on existing regimes seems to only guarantee that these works will 
continue to be lost to the world forever.  
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